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Price stickiness—the tendency of prices to remain constant despite changes in supply and demand—
has been linked to firms’ unwillingness to pay the costs entailed in setting, implementing, and
advertising new prices. However, there is little consensus on the size and importance of these
“repricing costs.” Taking the imported beer market as their subject, the authors of this study 
find repricing costs to be markedly higher for manufacturers than for retailers and conclude 
that, at the wholesale level, these costs are a significant deterrent to price adjustment.
W
hen Coca-Cola was first introduced in 1886, 
the price of a bottle was set at five cents.
The   Coca-Cola Company did not change this
price again for more than seventy years, despite experienc-
ing a number of large increases in its costs over the
period—including a threefold rise in the price of sugar in
the 1920s.1Although an extreme case, this example points
to an issue that economists puzzle over: Why don’t firms
change their prices more often in response to changes in
demand or supply? Economists refer to this phenomenon
as price “stickiness” or “rigidity,” and some attribute it to
firms’ unwillingness to pay the adjustment costs incurred
in altering prices. These adjustment costs—also termed
“repricing costs”—include the managerial time to deter-
mine a new optimal price, the cost of printing new price
tags and of advertising a new price, and the risk of losing
long-term customers when the price increases.
Adjustment costs may affect firms’ pricing decisions in
two ways. First, a firm might refrain from altering its price
because its own repricing costs exceed the expected
increase in revenues from such an action, even when all
other competing firms adjust their prices. Second, if the
firm believes that repricing costs will  induce competing
firms to keep their prices fixed, it may forgo a price adjust-
ment for fear of losing market share. In the first case, the
repricing costs have a direct effect on the firm’s decisions;
in the second, the effect is indirect, or “strategic.”
While many economic models assume that firms must
pay some fixed cost to adjust their prices, studies of pricing
behavior have not reached a consensus on the magnitude
and significance of these costs. The uncertainty stems in
part from the difficulty of measuring the underlying fac-
tors that may cause firms to refrain from changing their
prices following a cost increase. As former Federal Reserve
Governor Alan Blinder and his coauthors (1998) observe
in a recent book, “The most prominent theories of price
stickiness rely on variables that are either unobservable in
principle or unobserved in practice.”2
Our objective—both in this edition of Current Issues
and in the longer technical study on which this article is
based3—is to derive a measure of the costs of repricing
and to evaluate the importance of these costs in generating
the observed price patterns. To accomplish this task, we
focus on the pricing of imported goods. Imports are an
Current Issues Current Issues
IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Volume 13, Number 10 November 2007
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK
www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issuesCURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 10
ideal subject of study because the markets for such goods are
exposed to large and frequent exchange rate changes that
s h o ul d ca use d o m es ti c p ri c es t o c han g e .  B y e xaminin g
whether firms do, in fact, adjust their prices in response to
exchange rate changes, we can make some inferences about
the magnitude of repricing costs. We then use this informa-
tion to assess the importance of repricing costs relative to
other factors in creating sticky prices.
Using data on the imported beer market in a structural
model, we estimate the costs of repricing to be 0.4 percent of
firm revenue for manufacturers and 0.1 percent of firm rev-
enue for retailers. While these costs may not be large in
absolute terms, they are of sufficient magnitude to discour-
age firms—primarily at the wholesale level—from altering
their prices in response to an exchange rate change.
Our analysis also reveals how repricing costs compare in
importance with two other sources of price rigidity for
imported goods. The first of these is markup adjustment, or
the tendency of manufacturers and retailers to moderate any
increase in their prices in order to preserve their market
share. The second is the existence of a “local” component in
the price of imported goods, which consists of the costs of
transporting, storing, and marketing goods once these goods
have reached the destination market. Because these costs are
denominated in the import country’s currency (dollars in
the case of U.S. beer imports), they do not fluctuate with the
exchange rate. Like repricing costs, then, markup adjust-
ments and local costs contribute to the stickiness of prices
by limiting the degree to which those prices respond to
exchange rate changes—or, in the language of economists,
by rendering the transmission or “pass-through” of exchange
rate changes to prices “incomplete.” Our calculations suggest
t h a t  o f  t h e  i n c o m p l e t e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  p a s s - t h r o u g h  w e
observe in our sample of imported beer prices, 34 percent
stems from markup adjustment, 54 percent from local costs,
and 12 percent from repricing costs. Thus, although repric-
ing costs are not the dominant source of incomplete pass-
through, they are a substantial contributor to the low 
pass-through evident in the data. 
A Methodology for Measuring Repricing Costs
To estimate the adjustment costs entailed in changing prices,
we use store-level scanner data on beer prices, compiled over a
four-year period in the mid-1990s.4 The beer market is well
suited for investigating questions related to price stickiness
for two reasons: (1) highly detailed weekly data are available
on both wholesale and retail prices, allowing us to examine
how prices respond at each stage of the distribution chain;
and (2) the data reveal that both wholesale and retail beer
prices remain constant over periods of several weeks—an
indication that price adjustment costs may indeed be a con-
straint in this market. The methodology we propose, however,
is not tailored to the beer market, and can be more generally
applied to any market for which data are recorded at frequent
enough intervals to identify the points of price adjustment.
In addition, we choose to focus on the pricing of imported
beers. In investigating the sources of price rigidity, it is 
best to look at markets in which the marginal (or per unit)
increases in producer costs are sufficiently large to compel
producers to consider raising their prices. In markets for
imported goods, producers face large unanticipated cost
changes from short-run exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed,
exchange rates fluctuate by an order of magnitude more 
than do the prices of other inputs in the production of beer
(Chart 1). Thus, this high exchange rate volatility is our
assurance that we are studying goods whose producers must
frequently decide whether to change their prices or their
markups. A second advantage of studying imports is that
exchange rate movements’ pronounced effects on producer
costs are easy to measure and independent of other develop-
ments in the market that might affect pricing.
A look at the price data for one imported beer—a popular
British brand that we will call Britannia5—suggests the 
pricing patterns that are typical of many brands. Chart 2
tracks the retail and wholesale prices of a six-pack of
Britannia over the full sample period, from the middle of
1991 to the middle of 1995. The weekly frequency of the data
is ideal for analyzing the role of price stickiness, since we
clearly see that prices remain constant for several weeks and
then jump up (in a discrete step) to a new level.6 Although
the infrequent adjustment of prices is by itself no definitive
proof that price rigidities exist,7 the price movements in
Chart 2 are exactly what one would expect if price stickiness
was present. 
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1For details on the pricing of Coca-Cola, see Levy and Young (2005).
2See Blinder et al. (1998, p. 7). 
3This article summarizes the findings of empirical work described in detail in
Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007).
4Our data come from a major supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan
area with a market share of roughly 20 percent. The data record the retail and
wholesale prices for each product sold by the chain in 1991-95. The data can be
found at <http://research.chicagogsb.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/
index.aspx>. They were gathered by the James M. Kilts Center for Marketing at
the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business. 
5We adopt fictive names for each of the imported beer brands in our sample.
6The role of price stickiness cannot be analyzed within the framework that
Goldberg (1995) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) use to examine the auto
market or the one that Hellerstein (2006) uses to study the beverage market.
Since the frequency of the data used in these projects was either monthly or
annual, the econometrician observes prices changing every period given
price observations averaged over time. Thus, any price stickiness that may
exist is not apparent or—put differently—cannot be identified from the data.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 3
Another notable feature of Chart 2 is the fact that retail
prices always adjust when the underlying wholesale prices
adjust. Thus, it appears that the main reason retail prices in this
market remain constant for long periods is that the costs facing
retailers—as measured by the wholesale price—have not
changed. The situation is very different, however, at the whole-
sale level: there, manufacturers keep prices unchanged despite
the sharp changes in their costs created by exchange rate fluctu-
ations. The implication is that price rigidity is driven largely by
the behavior of wholesale prices.
In our empirical methodology, we use information from
both the periods in which prices adjust and the periods in
which prices remain unchanged to derive bounds on the
repricing costs associated with a price change. The reason-
ing behind our approach is as follows: In periods in which
prices change, it has to be the case that the costs of repricing
are lower than the additional profit the firm makes by alter-
ing its price; we can use this insight to derive an upper
bound for the repricing cost. Similarly, in periods in which
prices do not change, it has to be the case that the costs of
adjustment exceed the extra profit associated with a price
change; using this insight, we can derive a lower bound for
the repricing cost.
In addition to estimating the repricing costs, we also seek 
to quantify the importance of the two other sources of price
stickiness identified in the introduction: markup adjustment
and local costs. Recall that firms may adjust their markup—
that is, refrain from fully passing through an exchange rate
change to their prices—if they fear losing customers to the
competition.8 Similarly, the presence of local costs in the final
price of imported goods—for the storage, transport, and mar-
keting of goods in the import country—means that only a por-
tion of the final price will fluctuate with exchange rate changes.
Our methodology explicitly accounts for these alternative
sources of price stickiness and measures their importance.
In assessing the significance of repricing costs, we exam-
ine their indirect or strategic effects on firms’ pricing 
decisions as well as their direct effects. For example, if price
changes are not synchronized across firms (and the empiri-
cal evidence suggests that they are not), even small adjust-
ment costs can induce significant price rigidity: each firm
may be unwilling to change its price materially if it assumes
that its competitors will not change their prices. To evaluate
the overall impact of repricing costs, we therefore consider
the prices that firms would set following an exchange 
rate change in three different scenarios: the first with fully
flexible prices, the second with price rigidities arising from 
a firm’s own repricing costs, and the third with rigidities
arising from a firm’s assumptions about competitors’ repric-
ing costs. The difference between the response of prices 
in the first scenario, on the one hand, and the second and
third, on the other, is attributed to the effect of repricing
costs. The box explains our methodology in greater detail.
Results
We find repricing costs to be significant, both in magnitude
and in the constraints they place on firms’ price adjust-
ments. Our calculations of the size of the repricing costs 
are reported in Table 1. The entries in the first and third
columns report the mean of the upper bound on each
brand’s repricing cost as a share of its total revenue in a given
7In principle, prices may not change simply because nothing else changes.
8Note that throughout this article, our calculations of markup adjustments
exclude the adjustments attributable to fixed repricing costs.
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; Eurostat; IMF International Financial Statistics.
Note: Each series is normalized to 1 in January 1991. 
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Chart 2
Weekly Retail and Wholesale Prices for Britannia Beer
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week. As our look at the data on beer import prices would
lead us to expect, manufacturer (wholesale) repricing costs
are generally larger as a share of revenue than retail repricing
costs: The upper-bound estimates of manufacturers’ repric-
ing costs range from 0.3 percent of revenue for Mexicana to
3.2 percent of revenue for Germania, with a mean of 2.2 per-
cent of revenue across all foreign brands. The upper-bound
estimates of repricing costs for retailers range from 0.1 per-
cent of revenue for Hollandia to 0.4 percent of revenue for
Germania, with a mean upper bound across foreign brands
of 0.4 percent.9
The second and fourth columns of Table 1 report the sum
of the upper bounds for each brand’s repricing costs, com-
puted over only those periods in which prices changed,
divided by the total manufacturer or retail revenue for that
brand, computed over the full sample period. The sum of
repricing costs across all foreign brands is 0.4 percent of
total revenue for manufacturers and 0.1 percent of total reve-
nue for retailers.10
In the next step of our analysis, we conduct a simulation
exercise to quantify the contribution that repricing costs,
local costs, and markup adjustments make to price sticki-
ness. Specifically, we simulate the effects of a 1 percent
appreciation of the relevant foreign currency on the price of
our British, German, Mexican, and Dutch imported beers
and track how each of the three factors reduces the degree 
to which the exchange rate change is passed through to 
the price at different stages of the distribution chain. (These
computations are explained in greater detail in  Goldberg
and Hellerstein [2007].) Our results are reported in Table 2,
where each panel corresponds to one of the three simula-
tions we run. 
Simulation 1 
We begin by simulating the price effect of a 1 percent appreci-
ation of the relevant foreign currency under the assumption
that manufacturers and retailers face no repricing costs
4
9The lower bounds we compute, which we do not report here, are indistin-
guishable from zero across brands for both wholesale and retail prices.
10These numbers are close to those reported by Levy et al. (1997) and Dutta et al.
(1999), who use a similar procedure that divides the costs of repricing, calculated
only for those periods when prices changed, by the revenue earned by the firm
across all periods, whether prices changed or not. These studies report retailer
fixed costs of repricing to be 0.70 and 0.59 percent of revenue, respectively. Note,
however, that because our repricing costs are defined very generally to include all
factors that may prevent firms from changing their nominal prices (not just the
labor and material costs of changing prices), our numbers are not directly com-
parable to those of Levy et al. 
Table 1
Repricing Costs as a Share of Brand Revenue
Percent
Manufacturer Retailer
Beer Brand Mean Total Mean Total
Britannia 2.456 0.313 0.302 0.079
(.499)** (.091)** (.215) (.064)
Germania 3.196 1.127 0.379 0.208
(.060)** (.208)** (.332) (.179)
Mexicana 0.269 0.060 0.078 0.020
(.128)* (.039) (.054) (.022)
Hollandia 0.306 0.210 0.096 0.029
(.386) (.024)** (.057) (.019)
Overall 2.157 0.443 0.370 0.121
(.373)** (.077)** (.232) (.009)**
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The values reported are upper-bound estimates. Standard errors from bootstrap
simulations appear in parentheses.
*Significant at the 5 percent level.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
Empirical Methodology
The empirical methodology of this article and its compan-
ion technical study builds on Goldberg (1995), Goldberg
and Verboven (2001), Hellerstein (2006), and Nakamura
(2007). The methodology involves estimating first the
demand for the industry’s product, independently of the
supply side, and subsequently the supply side of the
model. Assuming that firms act as period-by-period profit
maximizers implies a set of first-order conditions that can
be estimated (once the demand-side parameters are esti-
mated) to back out the marginal costs and markups in the
industry, including separate traded and nontraded (local)
components. This decomposition allows one to examine
how the particular components of prices (traded cost com-
ponent, nontraded cost component, and markup) respond
to exchange rate or other cost changes.
A key element of our approach, which is fully docu-
mented in Goldberg and Hellerstein (2007), is to allow
firms to deviate from their first-order conditions because of
the existence of fixed costs of repricing. The underlying
premise is that once a firm decides to incur the adjustment
cost associated with a price change, it will set the product’s
price according to the first-order conditions of its profit
maximization problem. The estimation takes into explicit
account that each firm’s behavior is affected by the exis-
tence of price rigidities and by the behavior of competitors.
Once the model is estimated, we exploit information
from both the periods in which prices adjust and the peri-
ods in which prices remain unchanged. The principal
insight is that in periods in which prices change, the costs
of repricing must be lower than the additional profit the
firm makes by altering its price, while in periods in which
prices do not change, the repricing costs must exceed the
extra profit associated with a price change. Hence, using
this methodology, we can derive lower and upper bounds
for the costs of repricing.www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues 5
(Table 2, top panel). Only 50 percent of the exchange rate
increase is passed through to the manufacturer’s total cost11
after accounting for local costs (column 1). This finding is
based on calculations in our longer, technical study showing
that the average local cost incurred by foreign manufacturers
for transportation, marketing, and similar services is roughly
50 percent of their total costs. Thus, the median pass-through
value of 50 percent means that only half of the manufac-
turer’s total costs will increase with the currency apprecia-
tion; the remainder, consisting of local costs denominated in
dollars, will be insulated from the exchange rate change. After
manufacturer markup adjustments are taken into account
(column 2), the percentage of the exchange rate increase that
is passed through to wholesale prices declines substantially.
T o be sure,  the markup adjustments vary widely across
brands: the median pass-through rate of the currency appre-
ciation ranges from 13.1 percent for Britanniato 33.4 percent
for Hollandia. But the median pass-through value across all
brands—only 18.3 percent—suggests that markup adjust-
ments do play a large role in keeping wholesale prices rigid. 
When retailer local costs—such as store maintenance,
wages, and local advertising—are taken into account (col-
umn 3), the median pass-through rate edges down to 15.4 per-
cent across all brands and ranges from 11.2 percent for
Britanniato 27.1 percent for Hollandia. Finally, the inclusion of
the retailer’s markup adjustment lowers the pass-through rate
to 14.3 percent across all brands; retail pass-through ranges
from 11.3 percent for Britanniato 26.7 percent for Hollandia.
Simulation 2
Our second simulation assumes that only the manufacturer
of the foreign brand affected by the exchange rate change
faces fixed repricing costs, while the prices of all other brands
adjust freely (Table 2, middle panel). This experiment essen-
tially tests what we have described as the direct effects of
repricing costs on manufacturers’ pricing decisions. In other
words, the experiment asks, What percentage of the currency
appreciation will manufacturers pass through to their prices
once they compare their repricing costs with the increased
revenue they would expect from raising their prices? In this
simulation, we incorporate our estimates of the magnitude of
repricing costs for the different beer brands.
Looking at the first column, we see that the percentage 
of the currency appreciation that is passed through to the
manufacturer’s total cost is again 50 percent once we adjust
for the dollar-denominated local costs that are unaffected 
by the exchange rate change. But the pass-through rate to
wholesale prices, shown in the second column, now varies
significantly across brands depending on whether repricing
costs are large enough to deter individual manufacturers
from raising their wholesale prices. The median pass-
through rate for Mexicana and Hollandia (interestingly, the
imports with the highest market share) is about 30 percent.
By contrast, for Britannia and Germania, the two brands that
had the highest repricing costs, the pass-through rate is 
0 percent—meaning that the manufacturers of these beers
leave their wholesale prices unchanged. 
The percentage of the currency appreciation that is passed
through to retail prices is naturally 0 percent for the two
Table 2
Contribution of Repricing Costs to Price Stickiness 
following an Exchange Rate Change
Simulated Effect of a 1 Percent Foreign Currency Appreciation
Percentage of Exchange Rate Increase Passed Through to 
Wholesale Prices Retail Prices
After Accounting for After Accounting for
Beer Brand Local Costs Markup Adj. Local Costs Markup Adj.
Assuming no repricing costs
Britannia 50.1 13.1 11.2 11.3
(.000)** (.0995) (.0878) (.1251)
Germania 50.1 16.3 13.5 13.4
(.000)∗∗ (.1108) (.1006) (.1243)
Mexicana 50.1 29.9 26.3 25.5
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Hollandia 50.1 33.4 27.1 26.7
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 18.3 15.4 14.3
(.000)∗∗ (.1040) (.0906) (.1326)
Assuming own-brand repricing costs
Britannia 50.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Germania 50.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Mexicana 50.1 29.9 26.3 25.5
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Hollandia 50.1 33.4 27.1 26.7
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 8.3 6.2 6.0
(.000)∗∗ (.0632) (.0344) (.0566)
Assuming competitor-brand repricing costs
Britannia 50.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Germania 50.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
(.000)∗∗ (.000) (.000) (.000)
Mexicana 50.1 29.4 26.1 25.2
(.000)∗∗ (.0728)∗∗ (.0632)∗∗ (.1236)∗∗
Hollandia 50.1 32.1 26.6 25.9
(.000)∗∗ (.0641)∗∗ (.0544)∗∗ (.1160)∗∗
All 50.1 6.8 5.3 5.0
(.000)∗∗ (.0510) (.0302) (.0310)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table reports pass-through rates across 404 simulations. Standard errors from
bootstrap simulations appear in parentheses.
**Significant at the 1 percent level.
11Note that “manufacturer’s total cost” always refers to marginal costs and does
not include any fixed costs.CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE VOLUME 13, NUMBER 10
brands whose manufacturers refrained from changing their
wholesale prices. For Mexicana and Hollandia, the pass-
through rates are roughly 26 and 27 percent, respectively,
once the retailer local costs are taken into account, and
slightly lower once retailer markup adjustment is factored in. 
Across all four brands of beer, the median pass-through
to final retail prices is only 6.0 percent. Thus, taking into
account a brand’s own repricing costs reduces the percent-
age of the currency appreciation transmitted to prices from
14.3 percent (simulation 1) to 6.0 percent (simulation 2).
This reduction provides a measure of the direct contribution
that repricing costs make to sticky prices. Note that the
reduction stems from the manufacturers’ recognition that
the cost of altering the wholesale price of Britannia and
Germania exceeds the expected increase in profits; retail
repricing costs for these brands do not contribute to any
further reductions in the pass-through rate.
Simulation 3
The third simulation assumes that repricing costs are a con-
straint not only for the manufacturer whose brand is
affected by the foreign currency appreciation but also for the
manufacturer’s competitors. This experiment tests the indi-
rect or strategic effects of repricing costs by asking whether
manufacturers and retailers adjust their prices following a 
1 percent appreciation of the relevant foreign currency if
they take their competitors’ prices to be fixed. As before, high
repricing costs prompt the manufacturers of Britannia and
Germania to forgo any adjustment of their wholesale prices;
the pass-through rate is zero (column 2). But what is differ-
ent in this simulation is that the pass-through rates for those
brands whose prices do adjust—Mexicana and Hollandia—
have fallen relative to their values in simulation 2. This addi-
tional reduction in the pass-through rates, seen at both the
wholesale and retail level, is a measure of the indirect effect
of repricing costs: Because firms assume that repricing costs
will prevent their competitors from raising their prices, they
will moderate their own price increases more than they
would under fully flexible prices. Overall, this effect accounts
for the reduction of the wholesale pass-through rate across
all brands (column 2) from 8.3 percent in simulation 2 to 
6.8 percent in simulation 3, and the reduction of the retail
pass-through rate across all brands (column 4) from 6.0 per-
cent in simulation 2 to 5.0 percent in simulation 3.
Taken together, the three simulations underscore the
importance of repricing costs in one other way. The actual
pass-through rate to wholesale prices observed in our 1991-95
sample is between 6 and 7 percent. Our first simulation 
suggests that local costs and markup adjustments together
reduce pass-through at the wholesale level to 18.3 percent.
However, when we add repricing costs to our model (in the
second and third simulations), the pass-through rate to
wholesale prices drops to 6.8 percent, matching the rate docu-
mented in the data. 
A Breakdown of the Sources of Price Rigidity
We have seen that repricing costs, local costs, and markup
adjustments all contribute to the stickiness of import prices.
They do so by inhibiting the pass-through of exchange rate
changes to wholesale and retail prices. In this section, we use
the results of our simulations to compute the share of the
incomplete transmission of our 1 percent foreign currency
appreciation that can be attributed to each of the three factors.
Manufacturers’ local costs play the most significant role
in the incomplete transmission of the original cost increase
to retail prices (Table 3). Following a 1 percent appreciation
of the relevant foreign currency, these costs are responsible
for roughly half, or 52.5 percent, of the observed retail price
rigidity. Manufacturers’ markup adjustments account for
33.5 percent of the remaining rigidity, and manufacturers’
own repricing costs for another 10.5 percent. At the retail
level, roughly 1.6 percent of the incomplete pass-through is
attributable to local costs; retailers’ markup adjustments and
own repricing costs have a negligible role in explaining the
incomplete transmission. Finally, the competitive effects of
rival brands’ repricing costs account for 1.6 and 0.1 percent
6
Table 3
Breakdown of the Incomplete Pass-Through of a 1 Percent Foreign Currency Appreciation to Consumer Prices
Percent
Share Attributable to Manufacturers’ Share Attributable to Retailers’ 
Markup Own Repricing Competitor Markup Own Repricing Competitor
Beer Brand Local Costs  Adjustment Costs Repricing Costs Local Costs Adjustment Costs Repricing Costs
Britannia 49.9 37.0 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Germania 49.9 33.8 16.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexicana 66.7 27.0 0.0 0.7 4.4 1.1 0.0 0.1
Hollandia 67.3 22.5 0.0 1.8 7.4 0.5 0.0 0.4
All 52.5 33.5 10.5 1.6 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The table reports median values across 404 simulations. of the incomplete pass-through by manufacturers and retail-
ers, respectively. These results support the initial impression
formed from the data (see Chart 2): the effects of repricing
costs are most evident in the infrequent change of wholesale
prices, while such costs play only a minor role in explaining
the stickiness of retail prices.
As we have observed, repricing costs may affect the pric-
ing decisions of a particular producer in direct and indirect
ways. Our simulations indicate that the direct effect is signifi-
cant at the wholesale level, accounting for 10.5 percent of the
incomplete pass-through on average. In contrast, at the retail
level, firms’ own costs of repricing have no effect—a finding
that accords with the small magnitude of repricing costs we
estimate for retailers. There is, however, an indirect effect at
this stage of the distribution chain that accounts for approxi-
mately 0.1 percent of the incomplete pass-through. Thus, it
seems that the direct effect of repricing costs is only signifi-
cant at the wholesale level, while the indirect effect plays a
role at both the wholesale and the retail level. 
Our final breakdown of the sources of price stickiness
attributes 54.1 percent of the incomplete pass-through to local
costs (52.5 percent at the wholesale and 1.6 percent at the
retail level), 33.7 percent to markup adjustment (33.5 per-
cent at the wholesale and 0.2 percent at the retail level), and 
12.2 percent to the existence of repricing costs, 1.7 percent of
which represents the indirect or strategic effect of such costs. 
Conclusion
What accounts for the resistance of prices to change? In this
article, we conduct simulation exercises to identify the rela-
tive importance of various sources of price stickiness for
imported goods. We find that the rigidity of prices is driven
primarily by the behavior of wholesale prices. At the whole-
sale level, manufacturers’ local costs play the largest role in
reducing price changes, and markup adjustments also con-
tribute heavily. However, these two factors alone cannot
completely explain the infrequent price adjustment we
observe. Indeed, it is only when we include repricing costs
in our simulations of the price effects of a foreign currency
appreciation that our results match the pass-through rates
we observe in the data. Thus, repricing costs—the costs
involved in setting, implementing, and advertising new
prices—emerge as an important deterrent to price adjust-
ments, particularly for manufacturers. 
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